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In this paper we propose an extended version of the ping-pong protocol and study its security.
The proposed protocol incorporates the usage of mutually unbiased bases in the control mode. We
show that, by increasing the number of bases, it is possible to improve the security of this protocol.
We also provide the upper bounds on eavesdropping average non-detection probability and propose
a control mode modification that increases the attack detection probability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A method of quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC), contrary to quantum key distribution (QKD)
schemes, offers the confidential exchange of determinis-
tic messages without key agreement [12]. The interest in
this fascinating idea started a decade ago in seminal pa-
pers of Beige et.al. [1] and Bostro¨m et.al. [2]. Since then
QSDC techniques have been developed following two dif-
ferent paradigms: exploiting indistinguishability of non-
orthogonal quantum states [1, 4, 14, 17, 22] and based on
entanglement of signal particles with a system inaccessi-
ble to the eavesdropper [2, 6, 18, 25]. The protocols from
the former family are usually simpler to implement at
the price of classic channel utilization in message mode,
although exceptions of this rule exist [14]. On the other
hand, the entanglement based ping-pong protocol uses
classic channel only in control mode [2]. This feature can
be exploited to build and additional cryptographic secu-
rity layer which improves security of the protocol [20, 24].
The ping-pong protocol has been also improved and ex-
tended in other directions including super-dense infor-
mation coding [5, 21] and its variants based on higher
dimensional signal particles [19, 23]. However, in the
analyses of higher dimensional variants it was assumed
that control mode is executed in at most two dual bases.
This possibly understates an eavesdropping detectability.
The main aim of this paper is to show that, by increas-
ing the number of bases used in the control mode, it is
possible to decrease an upper bound of the attack non-
detection probability. Eavesdropping is most effectively
detected if subsequent tests are executed in randomly
selected mutually unbiased bases (MUB) [8]. Unfortu-
nately, the problem of finding MUB for the arbitrary
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Hilbert space remains unsolved and constructive solu-
tions exist only for spaces of dimension N = pm where
p is prime [7, 10] and/or spaces with dimension not ex-
ceeding six [3, 15].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Mutually Unbiased Bases
A sequence of orthonormal bases {B(0),B(1), . . . ,B(M)}
of CN is called MUB if, for any two elements |b(m)k 〉 ∈
B(m), |b(n)l 〉 ∈ B(n), the following condition holds
∣∣∣〈b(m)k |b(n)l 〉∣∣∣2 = δm,nδk,l + 1N (1− δm,n) , (1)
where N denotes the dimension of underlying Hilbert
space. The explicit construction of MUB is only known
in the case of dimension N = pm, where p is a prime and
m is a positive integer [7]. For an odd prime p we have [7]
|b(l)k 〉 =
N−1∑
q=0
B
(l)
k,q|b(0)q 〉
=
1√
N
N−1∑
q=0
ω	kqω(l−1)qq2|b(0)q 〉,
(2)
where ω = e2pii/N , circled operations , , 	 denote
multiplication, division and subtraction in the finite field
GF(pm) respectively and |b(0)q 〉 are vectors of computa-
tional basis. In the case of p = 2 the explicit formulas
for the MUB elements are more involved [10].
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2B. Ping-pong protocol operation
Bob, the recipient of information, prepares an EPR
pair composed of qudits [9]
|ψ0,0〉 = 1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
|b(0)k 〉|b(0)k 〉. (3)
One of the qudits, referred to as ’home’, is kept confiden-
tial, while the second one, called ’travel’, is sent to Alice.
Because of an entanglement, Alice’s manipulations on the
travel qudit induce non-local effects. Alice is able to en-
code 2 log2N bits of information per one protocol cycle
applying one of the unitary transformations
Uµ,ν =
N−1∑
k=0
ωµk|b(0)k+ν〉〈b(0)k |, (4)
where µ, ν = 0, . . . , N − 1. Operator (4) transforms the
initial state into another EPR pair |ψµ,ν〉 [13] which can
be unambiguously discriminated by Bob when the ’travel’
qudit is returned by Alice. Eavesdropping Eve cannot
distinguish the travel qudit on its way forth and back
from a maximally mixed state
ρt =
1
N
N−1∑
α=0
|b(0)α 〉〈b(0)α |, (5)
so this way she cannot infer any information about the
encoding operation used by Alice. Because of that indis-
tinguishability, further analysis can be carried out as if
Bob sent one of the randomly selected states |b(0)α 〉 [2].
However, Eve can entangle the ’travel’ qudit with some
ancilla system before it reaches Alice
|ψα〉 = A|b(0)α , φ〉 =
N−1∑
l=0
aα,l|b(0)l , φα,l〉, (6)
where α = 0, . . . , N − 1 and |φα,l〉 denotes Eve’s probe
states. That way, because of the introduced entangle-
ment, Alice’s encoding operation also modifies the state
of the ancilla. By inspection of the ancilla’s state Eve can
gain some information about the encoded message. On
the other hand, Eve’s attack operation inevitably breaks
the perfect correlation of the ’travel’ and ’home’ qudits,
and that violation can be detected when Alice and Bob
switch to control mode in which they perform local mea-
surements on the possessed qudits and classically com-
municate their results. Unfortunately, the control mode
executed only in computational basis is insufficient, as
Eve can mount an undetectable attack in which she can
infer half the information posted by Alice [19, 23]. It has
been also shown in [23] that the incorporation of dual ba-
sis removes such possibility. The question how protocol
detectability can be improved by taking into account all
possible mutually unbiased bases remains open.
Without loss of generality it may be assumed that
Bob sends a state |α〉 [2, 19]. It follows from (6) that
p
(0)
α = |aα,α|2 describes the non-detection probability
when computational basis B(0) is used in control mode.
If Alice selects another basis B(m) then the ’travel’ qudit
after attack is seen as
|ψα〉 = A|b(0)α , φ〉 =
N−1∑
k=0
cα,k|b(m)k , φα,l〉, (7)
where cα,k =
N−1∑
l=0
aα,l〈b(m)k |b(0)l 〉. The attack is not de-
tected in the basis B(m) with probability
p(m)α = |cα,α|2 =
∣∣∣〈b(m)α |aα,:〉∣∣∣2 , (8)
where |aα,:〉 =
N−1∑
l=0
aα,l|b(0)l 〉. The non-detection proba-
bility averaged over multiple control mode cycles is given
by
dα =
M−1∑
m=0
qmp
(m)
α , (9)
where M is the number of bases and qm describes relative
frequency of their selection.
It should be shown for completeness that in the control
mode Bob can unambiguously infer Alice’s local measure-
ment result as long as he is informed about the used ba-
sis. This follows from the fact that, as the local change of
basis does not influence the entanglement, the measure-
ment performed by Alice fully determines the outcome of
Bob’s measurement. Let us suppose that Alice performed
a measurement in the basis B and obtained symbol i. In
this case, the state of the system, after the projective
measurement, reads
(|Ui〉〈Ui| ⊗ 1l)
(∑
k
|k〉 ⊗ |k〉
)
= |Ui〉 ⊗
(∑
k
〈Ui|k〉|k〉
)
= |Ui〉 ⊗ |Ui〉,
(10)
where Ui is i
th vector of the basis B. From the above one
can notice that, if Bob performs a measurement in the
basis B, he will obtain the symbol i with probability 1.
III. BOUNDS ON THE NON-DETECTION
PROBABILITY
Let us begin with general theorem concerning non-
detection probability.
Theorem 1. Let {B(0),B(1), . . . ,B(M)} be a set of M+1
orthonormal bases, used in the control mode of the proto-
col and selected equally frequently. Then, the upper bound
3for the average non-detection probability (9) is given by
dα ≤ 1
M + 1
σ21(V
(α)), (11)
where σ1(V
(α)) denotes the greatest singular value of
V (α) =
{
B
(i)
α,j
}
ij
.
Proof. Let us denote by vm the α
th element of B(m). By
V (α) we denote a matrix with rows given by bra vectors
〈vm|, i.e. V (α)m,j = B
(m)
α,j (overline denotes complex conju-
gate). If control bases are selected equally frequently the
average non-detection probability (9) can be written as
dα =
1
M + 1
∥∥∥V (α)|aα,:〉∥∥∥2 , (12)
and since max|x〉
∥∥V (α)|x〉∥∥2 = σ21(V (α)) we obtain the
result.
Let us now assume that the control mode is executed
in M+1 mutually unbiased bases. In this case the upper
bound on the non-detection probability is stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the control mode is executed in M + 1
mutually unbiased bases, then the average non-detection
probability is bounded by
dα ≤ 1 +M/
√
N
1 +M
. (13)
Proof. Let us introduce a matrix W = V (α)V (α)† where
V (α) is defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. Directly
from the definition of matrix V (α) and MUB condition (1)
we get
Wi,j = 〈vi|vj〉 = {δi,j + (1− δi,j)eiφi,j/
√
N}Mi,j=0. (14)
Note that matrix W does not depend on the particular
α. The maximal singular value of the matrix W can be
bounded as [16] (see also inequality [11, Eq. (3.7.2)])
σ1(W ) ≤
(max
i
∑
j
|Wi,j |)(max
j
∑
i
|Wi,j |)
1/2 . (15)
Taking into account (14) we get
max
i
∑
j
|Wi,j | = max
j
∑
i
|Wi,j | = 1 +M/
√
N, (16)
and the result follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that
σ21(V
(α)) = σ1(W ).
In the case of dimension N = pm for prime p and
m being a positive integer, there exists a set of N + 1
mutually unbiased bases [7], and the bound (13) reads
dα ≤ 1 +
√
N
1 +N
. (17)
It is possible to improve this bound using explicit expres-
sion (2).
Theorem 3. Let N = pm where p is an odd prime and
m is a positive integer. Then the maximal non-detection
probability is bounded by
dα ≤ 3
1 +N
. (18)
Proof. Let us introduce matrix W = V (α)†V (α) for some
fixed α
Wµ,ν =
N∑
q=0
(V (α)†)µ,qVq,ν =
N∑
q=0
B(q)α,µB
(q)
α,ν . (19)
Matrix W may be decomposed as W = P +Q:
Pµ,ν = B
(0)
α,µB
(0)
α,ν = δα,µδα,ν , (20)
Qµ,ν =
N∑
q=1
B(q)α,µB
(q)
α,ν
= ω	α(µ	ν)
1
N
N∑
q=1
ω(q−1)(µµ	νν)2
= ω	α(µ	ν)δµµ	νν,0, (21)
where we have used identities ωkωl = ωk⊕l and∑N−1
k=0 ω
kl = Nδl,0 (see eg. [7]). Thus, |Qµ,ν | =
δ(µ	ν)(µ⊕ν),0 and using bound (15) we get σ1(Q) ≤ 2.
Obviously σ1(P ) = 1. Thesis follows from (11) combined
with σ21(V ) = σ1(W ) and inequality [11, Eq. (3.3.17)]
σ1(P +Q) ≤ σ1(P ) + σ1(Q) = 3. (22)
It has been shown that usage of at least two dual
bases is sufficient to ensure asymptotic protocol secu-
rity [23]. However, the detection capabilities of the con-
trol mode are significantly improved when more mutually
unbiased bases are used. This follows from the compar-
ison of the bound on average non-detection probability
obtained in [23] (curve (d) on Fig. 1) with the bounds
obtained herein (curves (b) to (d)). The improvement of
the protocol’s detectability becomes more apparent with
the increase of the dimension of the underlying Hilbert
space – for bound from [23] we have limN→∞ dmax = 1/2
while for (17) and (18) limN→∞ dmax = 0. Although
the asymptotic behavior of the bounds (17) and (18) is
similar, they differ in the provided optimality.
The comparison of the considered bounds with nu-
merical results is presented in Fig. 1. It follows that
bound (18) is close to optimal. It was also verified that
the best fitting to numerical estimates is achieved for
σ21(V ) =
1
2 (3 +
√
5) ≈ 2.618.
Further improvement can be proposed based on the
analysis of the proof of Theorem 3. The matrix P is
related to the control mode tests executed in the compu-
tational basis. If that basis is excluded from the control
mode, one obtains a better protocol behaviour. We can
state the following.
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FIG. 1: Comparison of upper bounds on average proba-
bility of non-detection calculated: a) via numerical simula-
tions, b) with expression (18), c) with expression (17), d)
when only two bases are used in control mode [23] (dmax =
(1 + 1/
√
N)/2).
Corollary 1. Let us assume, that N = pm, where p is
an odd prime and m is a positive integer, and the compu-
tational basis is excluded from the control mode. In this
case an average non-detection probability is bounded by
dα ≤ 2/N. (23)
It should be noted that, as the information is encoded
and decoded in the computational basis, Eve still has to
use this basis for an attack preparation. Comparing the
above bound with the numerical estimate for the semi-
nal protocol, we observe about 30% improvement in an
attack detection capabilities.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed an extended version
of the ping-pong protocol, which incorporates the usage
of mutually unbiased bases in the control mode. We
provided upper bounds on eavesdropping average non-
detection probability in the proposed protocol.
If the communicating parties use M + 1 mutually un-
biased bases in the control mode, the bound is given by
the leading singular value of the matrix with rows given
by the appropriate bra vectors. One should note that
the number M of bases used in the control mode should
depend on the dimension.
If the communicating parties use particles of dimension
N = pm, where p is an odd prime and m is a positive inte-
ger, it is possible to provide a better estimate. Assuming
that Alice and Bob use N + 1 bases and construct them
according to [7], the non-detection probability averaged
over sufficiently many cycles never exceeds 3/(N + 1).
Eavesdropping detection capabilities can be improved by
the exclusion of the computational basis from the control
mode.
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